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Abstract 
The main purpose of this paper is to propose a theoretical framework for understanding the 
transformation of citizenship in complex societies. To this end, the paper is divided into six 
sections. The first section elucidates the main reasons for the renaissance of the concept of 
citizenship in the contemporary social sciences. The second section argues that a comprehensive 
sociological theory of citizenship needs to account for the importance of four dimensions:      the 
content, the type, the conditions, and the arrangements of citizenship. The third section suggests 
that in order to understand the sociological significance of T.H. Marshall’s account of legal, political, 
and social rights we need to explore the particular historical contexts in which citizenship rights 
became ideologically and institutionally relevant. The fourth section offers some critical reflections 
on the main shortcomings of the Marshallian approach to citizenship. The fifth section draws an 
analogy between the transformation of social movements and the transformation of citizenship. 
The sixth section sheds light on the fact that contemporary citizenship studies are confronted 
with a curious paradox: the differentiation of citizenship has led to both the relativistic 
impoverishment and the pluralistic enrichment of contemporary accounts of ‘the social’ and ‘the 
political’.The paper concludes by arguing that, under conditions of late modernity, the state’s 
capacity to gain political legitimacy increasingly depends on its ability to confront the normative 
challenges posed by the ubiquity of societal  complexity. 
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The main purpose of this paper is to propose a theoretical framework for understanding 
the transformation of citizenship in complex societies. Traditional notions of citizenship 
emerged with the rise of modern society. Hence, the rise of late modern or – as some 
would argue – postmodern society poses new challenges to contemporary discourses of 
citizenship. In the light of these challenges, a common assumption in the social sciences 
 
  
 
 
is that complex forms of society require complex forms of citizenship.1 With the aim of 
assessing the validity of this assumption, the paper is structured as follows. 
The first section is concerned with the reconceptualization of citizenship in recent 
sociological debates. As is widely acknowledged, the concept of citizenship has been 
enjoying a revival of paradigmatic significance in the social sciences. What are the socio- 
historical reasons for the thematic renaissance of the concept of citizenship? 
The second section seeks to show that valuable insights can be gained from the 
theorization of citizenship. To this end, a brief definition of citizenship, which captures 
some of its key features, is offered, and it is argued that a comprehensive sociological 
theory of citizenship needs to account for the importance of four dimensions: the content, 
the type, the conditions, and the arrangements of citizenship. Why can these dimensions 
be regarded as constitutive components of a critical sociology of citizenship? 
The third section centres on what may be described as the historicization of citizen- 
ship. Different traditions of social and political thought emphasize different dimensions 
of citizenship. One of the most influential approaches in modern sociological theory   is 
T.H. Marshall’s three-dimensional account of citizenship. What is the historical signifi- 
cance of legal, political, and social rights, and when did they become ideologically and 
institutionally relevant? 
The fourth section offers some critical reflections on what may be conceived of as the 
recontextualization of citizenship, which is based on a critical examination of the explan- 
atory value of Marshall’s account in the context of contemporary society. What are the 
theoretical and practical shortcomings of the Marshallian approach to citizenship, and 
what are the sociological implications of these shortcomings? 
The fifth section sheds light on more recent ideas about the autonomization of citizen- 
ship. In order to illustrate the sociological relevance of these ideas, an analogy can be 
drawn between citizenship and social movements. If there is sufficient empirical evidence 
to demonstrate that it makes sense to distinguish ‘old’ from ‘new’ social movements, it may 
also be appropriate to distinguish ‘old’ from ‘new’ forms of citizenship. Is it plausible to 
suggest that there is a normative tension between the institutionalism of modern forms of 
political participation and the autonomism of late modern forms of political participation? 
The sixth section analyses the complexification of society in terms of the differentia- 
tion of citizenship, focusing on the increasing influence of what is generally referred to as 
the ‘politics of difference’. On what grounds do most versions of the politics of difference 
advocate a radical reconceptualization of the idea of citizenship? Has the differentiation 
of citizenship led to the relativistic impoverishment or to the pluralistic enrichment of 
contemporary accounts of ‘the social’ and ‘the political’? And, finally, to what extent do 
increasingly complex forms of society require ever more complex forms of citizenship? 
 
The reconceptualization of citizenship – Citizenship in a 
new era: Neoliberalism, postcommunism, multiculturalism, 
and globalization 
 
Both in theoretically orientated academic discourses and in practically orientated political 
discourses, the concept of citizenship is highly contentious. This paper examines the 
concept of citizenship by drawing upon both classical and contemporary sociological 
  
 
 
 
approaches to the nature of social and political participation in the modern era. In recent 
years, the concept of citizenship has been enjoying a revival of considerable discursive 
relevance and intellectual scope in the social sciences.2 In order to make sense of this 
thematic renaissance, we need to understand the historical conditions under which citi- 
zenship has become an increasingly important concept in contemporary social and polit- 
ical thought. At least three significant historical dimensions have contributed to the rising 
interest in the concept of citizenship. 
The first factor is the consolidation of neoliberalism3 as the hegemonic ideology    in 
contemporary society. The triumph of the neoliberal model is strongly associated with 
the crisis of the welfare state. There is a complex set of social and political tendencies 
directly related to the dissolution of the post-war social-democratic consensus: privati- 
zation, de-nationalization, de-regulation, de-centralization, de-bureaucratization, and 
flexibilization – to mention only a few of the tendencies which lie at the heart of the 
neoliberal project. Under the neoliberal model, the ‘internal or domestic protection of 
citizenship rights for poor and disadvantaged citizens’ (Janoski, 1998: 4) competes with 
the external and global protection of capital rights for investment and trade. Thus, in the 
context of neoliberalism, citizenship appears to have been converted into an increasingly 
privatized affair of capitalist society. 
The second aspect is the emergence of what is commonly referred to as postsocialism 
or postcommunism:4 there is a widespread belief that, since the fall of the Berlin Wall and 
the end of the Cold War, we have come to live in a world in which there is no viable 
alternative to the ideological and material predominance of capitalism. The collapse of 
the socialist bloc in Eastern Europe epitomizes the triumph of capitalism in a postcom- 
munist world. The legitimacy of the neoliberal project seems to be confirmed by the 
quasi-ubiquity of capitalism on a global level. The ‘re-creation of citizenship and civil 
society in the transition to democracy and capitalism’ (Janoski, 1998: 4) forms an essen- 
tial part of the construction of an increasingly globalized world in which capitalism has 
succeeded in affirming its social legitimacy by virtue of its ideological and material 
hegemony. In other words, in the context of postcommunism, citizenship appears to have 
established itself as a universalized affair of a global capitalist society. 
The third element is the rise of multiculturalism,5 which is now widely recognized as 
a constitutive feature of a substantial number of advanced societies. Intensified flows of 
migration have led to complex processes of cultural hybridization which transcend tradi- 
tional, and hence national, frameworks of citizenship. In advanced societies, processes of 
systemic differentiation go hand in hand with processes of cultural fragmentation. The 
‘increasing international claims on citizenship by immigrants and refugees’ (Janoski, 
1998: 4) tend to undermine the political legitimacy of the nation-state, which is largely 
based on the belief in cultural homogeneity expressed in the ideological construction of 
an imagined community. The assumption that ‘a nation needs a state just as a state needs 
a nation’ may be considered complementary to the idea that ‘there is no nation without 
citizenship just as there is no citizenship without a nation’. Nevertheless, in the context 
of multiculturalism, citizenship appears to have become a hybridized affair of a global 
capitalist and multiplex society. 
In short, the renewed interest in the concept of citizenship is due to three main factors: 
the consolidation of the neoliberal project, the emergence of a postcommunist world, and 
the rise of multicultural politics. Under the neoliberal model, citizenship has been transformed 
  
 
 
into a privatized affair of an ever more commodified society; in the postcommunist 
context, citizenship has been turned into a universalized affair of an increasingly global- 
ized society; and, following the multicultural agenda, citizenship has been converted into 
a hybridized affair of a culturally fragmented society. 
These three dimensions can be regarded as the most crucial, but by no means the only, 
historical conditions which have led to a renewed interest in citizenship over the past 
decades. It is worth noting that the aforementioned factors – that is, neoliberalism, post- 
communism, and multiculturalism – are constitutive components of the globalization of 
society.6 The omnipresence of globalization poses the question of whether or not global- 
ized societies require globalized forms of citizenship. In this sense, the renewed interest 
in citizenship is, at least partly, due to the restructuration processes of an increasingly 
interconnected world. Regardless of whether or not we consider globalization to be a 
constitutive process of the present age, we cannot dissociate the discursive re-signification 
of citizenship from the structural transformation of society. 
 
The theorization of citizenship – The reality of citizenship: 
Content, type, conditions, and arrangements 
‘Citizenship can be described as both a set of practices (cultural, symbolic and economic) 
and a bundle of rights and duties (civil, political and social) that define an individual’s mem- 
bership in a polity’ (Isin and Wood, 1999: 4).7 In the light of this definition, it would be 
erroneous to reduce the notion of citizenship either to a merely sociological or to a purely 
legal category, for what is crucial to membership in a polity is the way in which the socio- 
logical and the legal aspects of citizenship are interrelated (see Isin and Wood, 1999: 4). The 
socio-relational and politico-legal dimensions of citizenship are mutually inclusive and 
interdependent, rather than mutually exclusive and competing, aspects of the modern world: 
just as social practices are regulated by the legal institutions of modern societies, judicial 
frameworks are shaped by the social practices of modern subjects. Recognizing the com- 
plexity of processes of structural differentiation in the modern world, a comprehensive the- 
ory of citizenship needs to account for the importance of four key dimensions: the content, 
the type, the conditions, and the arrangements of citizenship (see Turner, 1993: 3). 
First, the content of citizenship concerns both the entitlements and the obligations 
which arise from an individual’s membership in a polity. Thus, the content of somebody’s 
formal participation in a politically defined community refers to ‘the exact nature of the 
rights and duties which define citizenship’ (Turner, 1993: 3). If we accept that citizenship 
can be regarded ‘as a status which is enjoyed by a person who is a full member of a com- 
munity’ (Marshall, 1994: 54), then it becomes clear that the individual’s position in the 
modern world depends on the possibility of access to the rights conferred, and the duties 
imposed, by a particular polity in relation to a given society. The content of citizenship, 
however, can never be taken for granted as it is spatiotemporally contingent. The histori- 
cal specificity of every polity sets the parameters for the dynamic relationship between 
the state’s political legitimacy and the subjects’ political identity. Despite the fact that 
there are significant differences between historically specific forms of citizenship, one 
common feature of most modern forms of citizenship is that – following Marshall8 – they 
  
 
 
 
stipulate the legal, political, and social characteristics of rights and duties. These charac- 
teristics may be considered as the triadic nucleus of modern citizenship, but this is not to 
suggest that they therefore constitute a complete institutional framework of society. 
Citizenship is always a contentious, rather than a completed, project aimed at defining the 
relationship between the state and its subjects. Indeed, the possibility of the historical 
development of citizenship is indicative of the impossibility of its total completion. What 
manifests itself in the social and political struggles over the content of citizenship is the 
normativity which is inherent in all forms of social and political participation. 
Second, the type of citizenship refers to the specific form in which social and political 
participation is organized (cf. Marshall, 1964 [1963]). The content of every set of rights 
and obligations needs to be institutionalized in concrete social and political arrangements 
if it is aimed at allowing individuals to develop a sense of civic belonging to a given 
society. Empowering forms of citizenship must seek to make the creation of social and 
political participation possible in order to be more than a mere façade of decorative 
democracy. To be sure, abstract ideals – such as freedom and equality – can be pursued 
and defended by different political systems; the translation of these ideals into material 
reality, however, can differ substantially between political – for example, liberal- 
democratic and state-socialist – systems, demonstrating that the political legitimacy of 
powerful regimes is contingent upon the discursive elasticity of powerful ideas. Different 
forms of political organization favour different types of citizenship. In fact, social and 
political struggles over different types of citizenship are symptomatic of the contentious- 
ness which surrounds all practical attempts to translate abstract ideals into material reality. 
Third, the conditions of citizenship can be identified ‘with the social forces that 
produce … practices’ (Turner, 1993: 3) of civic participation by virtue of state power. 
The historical conditionality of citizenship is due to the social agency of the subject: 
there is no citizenship without citizens. To comprehend the conditions under which citi- 
zenship inscribes itself into the contingency of history requires accounting for the social 
conditionality of every polity: different contents and different types of citizenship emerge 
out of spatiotemporally specific conditions. The consolidation of citizenship is not a 
historical accident, but the result of social struggles over the establishment of the neces- 
sary conditions which allow for the right to political participation. Thus, citizenship does 
not exist simply in and for itself; rather, it exists through society, that is, it exists insofar 
as it is embedded in society. In this sense, it is not the nature of citizenship that explains 
the nature of social struggles, but, on the contrary, it is the nature of social struggles that 
explains the nature of citizenship. The historical indeterminacy of citizenship derives 
from the collective agency generated through social struggles over established forms of 
normativity. Every struggle for or against the legitimacy of a given polity corroborates 
the fact that no form of citizenship can possibly escape the malleability of the structural 
conditions which allow for the construction of society. 
Fourth, the arrangements of citizenship constitute the institutionalized ways in which 
‘benefits are distributed to different sectors of society’ (Turner, 1993: 3). In modern soci- 
ety, resources are distributed via administrative arrangements whose existence is guaran- 
teed by the institutionalization of citizenship. Hence, the recognition not only of legal and 
political rights but also of social rights is fundamental to the functioning of modern 
  
 
 
democracies. In fact, it is the cross-fertilizing function of legal, political, and social rights 
which converts citizenship into an effective political tool capable of guaranteeing people’s 
status as recognized members of a given society. The integrative power of citizenship 
hinges on the state’s capacity to unite and control a territorially defined and ideologically 
imagined community. The relative stability of citizenship rests on people’s identification 
with and commitment to the polity which represents their respective society. In the modern 
era, large-scale demographic integration is inconceivable without a minimal degree of 
state legitimation derived from social and political identification. The struggles over insti- 
tutionalized ways of allocating resources are a sign of the systemic need for legitimacy 
which is built into the integrationist nature of every modern polity. 
In short, a comprehensive theory of citizenship needs to account for the social com- 
plexity of four dimensions: the normativity of different contents of citizenship, the 
contentiousness of different types of citizenship, the malleability of the conditions of 
citizenship, and the legitimacy of the arrangements of citizenship. 
 
The historicization of citizenship – The Marshallian paradigm 
of citizenship: Civil, political, and social rights 
If we acknowledge that different sociological traditions emphasize different dimensions of 
citizenship, it comes as no surprise that diverging approaches to citizenship put forward 
diverging conceptions of citizenship. Indeed, the multiplicity of sociological approaches to 
particular aspects of human reality is indicative of the complexity underlying the multilay- 
ered construction of society. Theories of citizenship are no exception: what manifests itself 
in the plurality of different approaches to citizenship is the complexity of the constitutive 
elements of citizenship. By definition, all sociological concepts are subject to the multidi- 
mensional scrutiny of perspectival pluralism. Concepts do not enjoy the transcendental free- 
dom of existing – as free-floating categories – beyond the specific cognitive interests9 by 
which all knowledge-producing entities, including social scientists, are unavoidably driven; 
on the contrary, explanatory bias has to be understood as an integral part of social theorizing. 
Applying this epistemological insight to the debate on the concept of citizenship, it is crucial 
to recognize that the way in which citizenship is theorized depends largely on the explana- 
tory presuppositions implicitly operative in a given social analysis. Thus, in one way or 
another, every theory of citizenship – whether it considers itself to be ‘moderate’ or ‘radical’, 
‘left’ or ‘right’, ‘progressive’ or ‘conservative’ – is impregnated with the ideological param- 
eters of its own explanatory framework. 
The complexity of social analysis, which is partly due to the diversity of available 
explanatory tools, is reflected in the fact that all attempts to categorize different theoreti- 
cal approaches to citizenship are necessarily undertaken under specific typological crite- 
ria.10 Within the field of citizenship studies, three prominent theoretical traditions – with 
diverging sociological emphases and explanatory presuppositions – can be distinguished: 
the Marshallian theory of citizenship, the Tocquevillian/Durkheimian account of civic 
culture, and the Gramscian/Marxist model of civil society (cf. Janoski, 1998: 6). Rather 
than examining the respective strengths and weaknesses of these theoretical traditions, 
this section aims to stress the sociological significance and continuing relevance of 
Marshall’s theory of citizenship (see Marshall, 1964 [1963]; see also Marshall, 1981). 
  
 
 
 
Marshall’s theory of citizenship is based on a – by now well-known – typology of 
citizenship rights. According to this typology, the historical development of civic forms 
of belonging and participation manifests itself in the evolutionary development of citi- 
zenship rights. Given its evolutionist underpinnings, Marshall’s theory can be regarded 
as a ‘stage theory’, that is, as a sociological theory which identifies three decisive his- 
torical stages that are particularly relevant to understanding ‘the struggle for, and attain- 
ment of, citizenship’(Mann, 1994 [1987]: 63) in the modern era. In the light of Marshall’s 
tripartite conception of citizenship, the following three dimensions are crucial to the 
historical development of modern citizenship: civil, political, and social rights. From 
Marshall’s perspective, citizenship can be considered as a mediator between the princi- 
ple of economic liberty and the principle of social equality: the conflict between the 
individualistic pursuit of economic liberty and the collectivistic quest for social equality 
lies at the heart of every regulated capitalist society. 
Civil citizenship constitutes a predominant paradigm of the eighteenth century, guaran- 
teeing the individual’s legal and judicial rights and thereby challenging the arbitrary power 
of the absolutist regimes of the premodern era. Political citizenship represents a predomi- 
nant paradigm of the nineteenth century, consolidating the individual’s participatory and 
electoral rights, which are central to the project of modern democracy. Social citizenship 
embodies a predominant paradigm of the twentieth century, particularly of the post-war 
period from 1945 onwards, ensuring the individual’s social rights to economic welfare and 
material security. The historical relevance of civil, political, and social rights is illustrated 
in the existence of three central institutions of modern society: the law courts, the parlia- 
ment, and the welfare system (see Turner, 1994b [1990]: 202; see also Turner, 2009: 68). 
There are at least three reasons why Marshall’s account of the historical development 
of civil, political, and social rights is central to a critical sociology of citizenship: first, 
owing to its theoretical relevance to the debates on citizenship in the contemporary social 
sciences; second, because of its empirical relevance to the study of citizenship rights and 
citizenship-based institutions in contemporary societies; and, third, in consid- eration of 
its normative relevance to the question of whether – and, if so, to what extent – Marshall’s 
triadic account of citizenship does justice to the structural complexity of advanced 
societies. In the face of this complexity, we need to examine the main pitfalls of 
Marshall’s account of citizenship. It is the purpose of the following section to provide a 
critical analysis of the Marshallian perspective. 
 
The recontextualization of citizenship – The complexity of 
citizenship:Against conceptual reductionism 
It is because of, not despite, the fact that Marshall’s theory of citizenship has been highly 
influential that it has been criticized on several counts. Therefore, the numerous criti- 
cisms levelled against the Marshallian account of modern citizenship should be regarded 
as symptomatic not only of its substantial weaknesses but also of its overall explanatory 
strength. Notwithstanding Marshall’s significant contribution to the sociological study of 
citizenship, it is important to be aware of the fundamental pitfalls and shortcomings of 
the Marshallian perspective. Indeed, Marshall’s theory of citizenship can be questioned 
on at least six grounds. 
  
 
 
(i) Marshall’s theory of citizenship is problematic in that it is based on evolutionist 
assumptions. Thus, it can be criticized ‘for developing an evolutionary perspective on 
the historical emergence of citizenship’ (Turner, 1994b [1990]: 202). According to such 
an evolutionary view, the historical development of citizenship is shaped by the underly- 
ing driving forces which determine both the constitution and the evolution of modern 
society. To be more precise, Marshall’s evolutionist framework is founded on three 
assumptions: first, the assumption that the historical development of society in general 
and of citizenship in particular is inevitable (determinism); second, the assumption that 
this inevitable historical development is linear and progressive (teleologism); and, third, 
the assumption that citizenship rights can be regarded as ideological expressions and 
institutionalized effects of the historical development of modern society, guaranteeing 
the systemic stability and political legitimacy of capitalism (functionalism). In other 
words, Marshall’s evolutionist account of citizenship remains trapped in a deterministic, 
teleological, and functionalist understanding of social development. 
(ii) Marshall’s historical evolutionism can be characterized as idealistic ‘for failing to 
consider the wider social context’ (Turner, 1994b [1990]: 202) within which social rights 
were translated into welfare policy, namely in the Second World War period and in the 
post-war era. ‘Sociologists are prone to forget that “evolution” is usually geo-politically 
assisted’ (Mann, 1994 [1987]: 76).11 Marshall, in this regard, is no exception, for his 
account of citizenship fails to pay sufficient attention to the fact that the emergence of 
social rights is inextricably linked to the Second World War and the subsequent recon- 
struction period in Europe. In times of international war and national reconstruction, the 
systematic use of all-inclusive incorporation programmes constitutes an indispensable 
strategic imperative of nation-states, which – in the face of the difficult challenges posed 
by profound social and political crises – are forced to make extensive use of their mate- 
rial and ideological resources to unite and mobilize their respective populations. Given 
the historical determinacy of their emergence, it would be hard to deny that social rights 
are strategically allocated, rather than altruistically donated, by the nation-state. The 
legitimacy of social rights does not rise above but is contingent upon the  interest-laden 
historicity of social development. 
(iii) Marshall’s account of citizenship suffers from an unhealthy degree of formalism 
in that it seems to suggest that the attainment of citizenship rights in the twentieth century 
is a social process which is both complete and irreversible. According to this perspective, 
citizenship rights – once they are both recognized and institutionalized – represent 
irretrievable features of modern democracies. Nevertheless, the assumption that the 
consolidation of citizenship rights is both complete and irreversible is deeply flawed for 
at least two reasons. First, we need to acknowledge that complex societies require 
complex forms of citizenship. Complex forms of citizenship have to prove that they can 
transcend the limitations of Marshall’s tripartite framework of legal, political, and social 
rights and thereby do justice to the normative significance of other – for example, 
cultural, sexual, and human – rights.12 Second, we need to acknowledge that both the 
recognition and the realization of citizenship rights are far from irretrievable, as is 
unequivocally illustrated by the continuing presence and frequent resurgence of dictato- 
rial regimes in numerous parts of the world, which are powerful enough to ‘turn the clock 
back’. The consolidation of citizenship rights can always potentially be undermined  by 
  
 
 
 
their violation, just as the restoration of citizenship rights can always potentially be 
jeopardized by their abolition. To borrow two terms from the German language, the 
attainment of citizenship rights is never definitely abgeschlossen (completed), but always 
potentially ausgeschlossen (precluded). In the modern world, citizenship rights are both 
a central target and an effective vehicle of social struggles. With the rise of neoliberal 
policies, for instance, social rights have been relegated further down the agenda, for an 
essential component of the neoliberal project is to roll back the state by rolling forward 
the market. The systematic deconstruction of the welfare state implies the gradual dis- 
solution of social citizenship rights. If citizenship rights have one irreversible feature it 
is their reversibility. 
(iv) Given its emphasis on the development of citizenship rights in Britain, the 
Marshallian account remains largely ethnocentric. Marshall’s theoretical model consti- 
tutes an explanatory framework that may well provide an accurate account of the consti- 
tution and evolution of citizenship in Britain, but this does by no means guarantee that it 
can be equally applied to other countries. ‘Marshall’s logic of social progress has been 
found wanting when applied to other national experiences. In Germany, for instance, 
social policy innovation came first, in order to compensate for deficient political rights’ 
(Hemerijck, 2001: 138).13 The British – or, to be more precise, the English – experience 
does not necessarily coincide with the experience of other countries. Of course, it would 
be erroneous to assume – in accordance with an orthodox Marxist conception of social 
change – that there is a straightforward correlation between an ‘economic base’ and an 
‘ideological superstructure’.14 Yet, even if we reject an economistic conception of social 
change, we are compelled to acknowledge that different types of capitalism have created, 
and will always continue to create, different types of citizenship.15 
(v) Marshall’s take on citizenship may be criticized for being insufficiently radical and 
overly reformist in that it is based on the naïve assumption ‘that citizenship has rendered 
class struggle innocuous’ (Mann, 1994 [1987]: 63).16 Notwithstanding the question of 
whether or not capitalism and democracy can be reconciled, it is hard to refute that modern 
citizenship – in particular with regard to its provision of welfare rights – serves as a legit- 
imizing vehicle for class compromise, rather than as a delegitimizing vehicle for class 
struggle. The integrative function of social citizenship manifests itself in its systemic 
power not to undermine but to stabilize capitalism, thereby reaffirming its position as the 
hegemonic form of social reproduction in the modern era. The concession policies epito- 
mized in the introduction of social citizenship rights seek to overcome radicalism through 
reformism, revolutionism through revisionism, class struggle through class compromise, 
rebellion through restoration, and state communism through regulated capitalism. The 
institutionalization of class conflict through the consolidation of citizenship contributes to 
the reproduction, rather than the transformation, of class domination, in that it is aimed at 
mitigating, rather than instigating, the struggle between capital and labour.17 
(vi) Marshall’s theory of citizenship can be, and has been, attacked for providing a 
reductionist account of the development of citizens’ rights in modern society. The notion 
of reductionism, however, is a somewhat ambiguous one, not only because it seems to be 
fashionable in the social sciences to discredit particular approaches using this label, but 
also because the term ‘reductionist’ can be conceptually stretched in a number of ways. 
With regard to the question of whether Marshall’s account of citizenship can be applied 
  
 
 
to advanced – that is, increasingly complex – societies, there are at least three types of 
criticism on the basis of which the Marshallian approach may be accused of putting 
forward a reductionist conception of citizenship. 
First, inherent in Marshall’s account is a modernist tendency towards étatisme, which 
reduces citizenship to an ideological affair of the state apparatus and tends to underesti- 
mate the democratic potentials of what, in contemporary discourses, is commonly referred 
to as ‘civil society’,18 which can be legitimately regarded as the stronghold of active 
citizenship. 
Second, inherent in Marshall’s account is a modernist tendency towards universalism, 
which reduces citizenship to a quasi-transcendental political programme whose idealpo- 
litische strength lies in its a priori commitment to liberty and equality, but whose realpo- 
litische weakness manifests itself in its de facto blindness to identity and difference. 
Third, inherent in Marshall’s account is a modernist tendency towards teleologism, 
which reduces citizenship to a tripartite framework of legal, political, and social rights 
and which, as a result, portrays citizenship as a quasi-completed project, that is, as a nor- 
mative framework which does not allow for the inclusion of other – for example, cultural, 
sexual, and human – rights and thus fails to do justice to the increasing complexity of 
advanced societies. 
Taken together, these three elements – that is, étatisme, universalism, and teleologism – 
are a significant source of theoretical reductionism in Marshall’s account of citizenship. 
If we accept that citizenship does not represent an autonomous, let alone autopoietic, 
reality, then we also need to acknowledge that the nature and development of citizenship 
cannot be divorced from the constitution and evolution of society as a whole. In other 
words, the potential transformation of citizenship is intimately interrelated with the 
potential transformation of society. 
One of the most debated questions in contemporary social and political theory is 
whether or not, in the late twentieth century, modern forms of society have been replaced 
by ‘late modern’19 or ‘postmodern’20 forms of society. In the light of this dispute, one of 
the main issues to be examined in contemporary social and political analysis is the ques- 
tion of whether increasingly complex forms of society require ever more complex forms 
of citizenship. It shall be the task of the remainder of this paper to respond, however 
tentatively, to this question. 
 
The autonomization of citizenship – New challenges to 
citizenship: Between old and new social movements 
From a sociological perspective, it seems sensible to draw an analogy between citizen- 
ship and social movements because, over the past decades, both the alleged transforma- 
tion of the former and the alleged transformation of the latter have been extensively 
discussed in relation to the contention that we have entered a ‘late modern’, or possibly 
even ‘postmodern’, age.21 Owing to the profound structural transformations experienced 
by advanced societies, contemporary sociological accounts of citizenship and social 
movements tend to be based on the descriptive assumption that the nature and role of 
both the former and the latter have changed, as well as on the normative assumption that 
the nature and role of both the former and the latter ought to have changed. It is not  the 
  
 
 
 
purpose of this section to offer a detailed analysis of the emergence and characteristics of 
‘new social movements’ (see Susen, 2010). Rather, this section focuses on some key 
aspects which illustrate the sociological usefulness of providing a comparative analysis 
of citizenship and social movements. 
To assume that it ‘is important to put a particular emphasis on the notion of social 
struggles as the central motor of the drive for citizenship’ (Turner, 1994 [1990]: 203, 
italics added) means to suggest that citizenship is always in the process of being con- 
structed and reconstructed, negotiated and renegotiated, shaped and reshaped. In a simi- 
lar vein, to recognize that it is imperative to put a particular emphasis on the notion of 
social movements as the central motor of the drive for civil society means to acknowl- 
edge that civil society is always in the process of being built and rebuilt, structured and 
restructured, and formed and re-formed. Thus, it is essential to abandon a static and top- 
down conception of passive citizenship in favour of a dynamic and bottom-up concep- 
tion of active citizenship. For such a view permits us to shed light on the sociological 
implications of the fact that citizenship is both the outcome and the vehicle of social 
struggles: the very existence of citizenship should not be taken for granted but regarded 
as a historical achievement of painstaking negotiation over legitimate forms of social 
integration and political participation in the face of permanent modernization. 
Both contemporary forms of citizenship and contemporary social movements play a 
pivotal role in defining the political landscape of advanced societies. Yet, whereas the 
former tend to contribute to processes of social institutionalization, the latter are oriented 
towards processes of social autonomization. A prominent view in the current literature 
on collective action suggests that ‘new’ social movements, as opposed to ‘old’ social 
movements, have become increasingly influential collective actors capable of setting the 
political agenda in late modern societies. Hence, the obvious question to be asked is what 
makes ‘new’ social movements different from ‘old’ social movements. It is generally 
assumed that ‘new’ social movements share the following features. 
First, they are supposed to be primarily social and cultural. In contrast to classical 
forms of collective mobilization, they are – if at all – only secondarily political, since 
their target is the ‘mobilization of civil society, not the seizure of power’ (Feher and 
Heller, 1984: 37).22 
Second, bypassing the state and established institutions, they are ‘located within civil 
society’ (Taylor, 1989: 17, italics added). Therefore, they seek to realize their political 
aims not ‘from above’ through parliamentary decision-making processes using the state 
apparatus of pluralist societies, but ‘from below’ through grassroots decision-making 
processes bypassing the hegemonic forces of the political establishment. 
Third, they aim to bring about social change by focusing on the creation and spread 
of alternative values, life-styles, and identities. In this sense, they seek to develop idio- 
syncratic patterns of target articulation and reject mainstream patterns of social and political 
participation. 
Fourth, they stress the normative centrality of the quest for personal and collective 
autonomy in the day-to-day construction of an alternative society. This search for auton- 
omy, however, must not be misunderstood as a complete retreat from the political sphere 
or as a kind of escapism; rather, it should be seen as an ‘extension of politics to cover a 
wider range of concerns and social relations’ (Taylor, 1989: 17). Indeed, what manifests 
  
 
 
itself in the defence of both personal and collective autonomy is a sustained attempt to 
redefine citizenship in terms of a move away from ‘representative democracy’ embodied 
in the state towards ‘direct democracy’ based on civil society. 
As recent debates illustrate, ‘civil society’ is a controversial and historically variable 
concept in social and political theory.23 Yet, despite the fact that there are substantial 
points of divergence between different theoretical approaches to the concept of civil 
society, the predominant view in the literature is that the concept of civil society refers to 
a ‘third sector, situated between the state and the market’ (Serrano, 1999: 56).24 ‘Civil 
society is a combination of social movements, civil associations, informal groups and 
influent individuals of public opinion, whose action preserves and enlarges the horizons 
of social autonomy’ (Olvera Rivera, 1999: 343).25 Thus, civil society can be conceived 
of as ‘a sphere of freedom against a potentially despotic state’ (Friedmann, 1998: 21) and 
the commodifying market. New social movements are a stronghold of the third sector, 
firmly situated between the state and the market, for their target is not the seizure of 
institutional power but the mobilization of civil society. 
In the light of the above reflections, it would be fair to suggest that classical notions 
of citizenship are – or at least appear to be – diametrically opposed to contemporary 
notions of collective action, for the nature of new forms of social mobilization appears to 
differ significantly from the nature of old forms of citizenship. In contrast to new social 
movements, citizenship – at least in the classical sense – contains the following charac- 
teristics: (i) it is primarily legal, political, and social; (ii) it is located within the state; 
(iii) it is based on traditional patterns of participation; and (iv) it is embedded in conven- 
tional models of representative democracy. 
Hence, the main insight gained from drawing an analogy between citizenship and 
social movements can be described as follows: the normative tension between the insti- 
tutionalism of modern citizenship and the autonomism of new social movements indi- 
cates that there is a profound discrepancy between ‘early modern’ and ‘modern’ 
conceptions of participation, predominant in industrial societies, and ‘late modern’ and 
‘postmodern’ conceptions of participation, prevalent in postindustrial societies. In 
essence, there has been a paradigmatic shift from the ‘premodern’ preoccupation with the 
seizure of power and the ‘modern’ concern with the participation in power towards the 
‘late modern’ or ‘postmodern’ search for the autonomy from power.26 
If citizenship is to be located within the state, through which political participation 
and representation are made possible, then the legitimacy of classical forms of citizen- 
ship is substantially undermined by the posttraditional agendas of new social movements. 
The contemporary idea that civil society serves as a realm of collective empowerment 
‘from below’ challenges the traditional idea that citizenship serves as a realm of collec- 
tive empowerment ‘from above’.27 The former perspective is particularly common 
amongst defenders of deliberative forms of democracy, whereas the latter view tends to 
be embraced by advocates of representative forms of democracy. ‘A reappropriation of 
citizenship must not simply be tied to an abstract set of rights guaranteed by the “rule of 
law”, but address the deeper bases of social power’ (Taylor, 1989: 20). Just as ‘new’ 
social movements seek to overcome the étatisme of ‘old’ forms of collective mobiliza- 
tion, ‘new’ forms of citizenship need to go beyond the étatisme of ‘old’ forms of collec- 
tive representation. In order to allow for the possibility of democracy in the context   of 
  
 
 
 
increasing societal complexity, the gradual autonomization of social mobilization needs 
to go hand in hand with the gradual autonomization of citizenship. The normative 
grounds on which a convincing plea for the autonomization of citizenship can be made 
shall be examined in the following section. 
 
The differentiation of citizenship – The generality of 
citizenship:The particular problem of universalism 
Just as the emergence of ‘new social movements’ appears to undermine the legitimacy of 
classical forms of citizenship, the rise of the ‘politics of difference’ (Young, 1990) is an 
indication of the fact that traditional notions of social belonging and political participa- 
tion have lost a great deal of credibility. Nevertheless, this does not mean that citizenship 
has been transformed into an anachronistic appendage of the state whose integrative 
function ceases to have relevance in advanced societies.28 In the face of the increasing 
complexity of the late modern world, it is the legitimacy not of citizenship in general but 
of modern citizenship in particular which has come under attack.29 
The complexification of the contemporary world manifests itself in the differentiation 
of society into increasingly specialized and fragmented functional realms (see Susen, 
2007: 67–71, 92–93, 171–180, 185, and 192). The question that arises in the light of the 
fact that the contemporary world is shaped by profound cultural and systemic differen- 
tiation processes is to what extent increasingly complex forms of society require ever 
more complex forms of citizenship. The sociological significance of this question is 
reflected in the transformation of contemporary forms of social mobilization and politi- 
cal organization: just as traditional notions of citizenship have been challenged by post- 
traditional notions of citizenship, the agendas of old social movements have been 
contested by the agendas of new social movements. 
There is little doubt that the multiplicity of contemporary social movements enriches 
the discursive pluralism of civil society. Yet, in order for the emancipatory potentials of 
a diverse and polycentric civil society to have a tangible impact on the course of history, 
the discursive pluralism of new forms of collective mobilization needs to be translated 
into the institutional pluralism of new forms of political organization. Public spheres in 
advanced pluralistic societies tend to be characterized by the presence of an eclectic 
variety of social movements: proletarian movements; ethnic movements; religious move- 
ments; feminist movements; environmentalist movements; anti-racist movements; anti- 
fascist movements; peace movements; squatter movements; student movements; youth 
movements; gay, lesbian, and bisexual movements; civil rights movements; and animal 
rights movements – to mention only a few. The diversification of small-scale collective 
mobilization is intimately intertwined with the complexification of large-scale social 
organization. 
When comparing modern forms of citizenship and late modern forms of collective 
mobilization, we are confronted with various normative tensions, such as institutional- 
ism versus autonomism, universalism versus particularism, and equality versus differ- 
ence. What becomes obvious when reflecting on these tensions is that there is a stark 
contrast between ‘early modern’ and ‘late modern’ political agendas: a main strength   of 
new social movements is their capacity to recognize and promote difference and 
  
 
 
particularity; a key weakness of classical forms of citizenship is their incapacity to 
incorporate and institutionalize the widespread demand for the recognition and promo- 
tion of difference and particularity. 
Given the sociological importance of group-specific differences and particularities, 
the viability of differentialist models of citizenship depends on their ability to overcome 
at least three crucial shortcomings inherent in universalistic models of citizenship: 
 
(i) Universalistic models of citizenship tend to treat equality as sameness (totalization). 
(ii) Universalistic models of citizenship tend to homogenize the heterogeneous 
(hegemonization). 
(iii) Universalistic models of citizenship, by seeking to transcend group-specific 
differences, in practice tend to exclude and disempower particular social groups 
(marginalization). 
 
Far from being neutral or disinterested, this threefold universalization process rein- 
forces the privileged status of the most powerful social groups and the unprivileged status 
of the least powerful social groups. To totalize sameness means to suppress the other, not 
to recognize it. To hegemonize the heterogeneous means to colonize difference, not to 
respect it. And to marginalize the disempowered means to further exclude them, not to 
integrate them. 
In view of the above reservations, the ideal of universal citizenship turns out to be a 
somewhat ambiguous affair: its philosophical strength lies in its categorical commitment 
to equality; its practical weakness, however, emanates from its inherent tendency to rein- 
force social processes of totalization, hegemonization, and marginalization by ignoring 
and transcending, rather than recognizing and promoting, group-specific differences and 
particularities: 
 
In a society where some groups are privileged while others are oppressed, insisting that as 
citizens persons should leave behind their particular affiliations and experiences to adopt a 
general point of view serves only to reinforce that privilege; for the perspectives and interests 
of the privileged will tend to dominate this unified public, marginalizing or silencing those of 
other groups. 
(Young, 1994 [1989]: 391)30 
 
Thus, an emancipatory notion of citizenship which aims to acknowledge and promote, 
rather than ignore and suppress, group-specific differences would have to prove that it is 
able to translate the multiplicity of social and cultural particularities into a plurality of 
social and cultural citizenships: Marshall’s three-dimensional conception of citizenship – 
founded on civil, political, and social rights – would have to be extended to a multidimen- 
sional conception of citizenship – based on a large variety of socio-specific rights – in 
order to do justice to the material and ideological complexities to be faced in highly 
differentiated societies. 
What emerges when confronting the polycentric structurality which underlies every 
highly differentiated society is the possibility of creating an eclectic variety of different 
forms of citizenship: ‘civil citizenship’, ‘political citizenship’, ‘social citizenship’, ‘economic 
  
 
 
 
citizenship’, ‘cultural citizenship’, ‘reproductive citizenship’, ‘sexual citizenship’, ‘national 
citizenship’, ‘transnational citizenship’, and ‘global citizenship’ – to mention only a few 
possibilities. The slogan of differentialist models of citizenship is not ‘through sameness 
and equality against difference’ but ‘through difference against sameness and inequal- 
ity’.31 Nonetheless, we need to be aware of the fact that the late modern plea for differ- 
entialist models of citizenship is not necessarily less problematic than the modern plea 
for universalistic models of citizenship. To be exact, a critical theory of citizenship needs 
to account for the fact that differentialist models of citizenship are problematic in at least 
three respects. 
First, there is a philosophical problem. This philosophical problem concerns the 
normative tension between deontological universalism and utilitarian differentialism. 
According to the former perspective, everybody should be treated equally, and citi- 
zenship is to be understood as an institutional means for the pursuit of the common 
good. According to the latter perspective, social differences have to be recognized  and 
protected by the state, and socially heterogeneous forms of large-scale communi- ties 
have to be able to incorporate socially diversified realms of small-scale collec- tivities. 
The main philosophical problem with the idea of a differentiated citizenship, however, 
derives from the tacit essentialism upon which the politics of difference are 
potentially based. If the plea for a differentiated citizenship is motivated by the 
assumption that the meaning of difference should be converted into a political battle- 
field, then it runs the risk of contributing to the essentialist absolutization of identity 
and difference:32 
 
The irony of the logic of identity is that by seeking to reduce the differently similar to the same, 
it turns the merely different into the absolutely other. … Difference now comes to mean not 
otherness, exclusive opposition, but specificity, variation, heterogeneity. 
(Young, 1990: 99 and 171) 
 
If differentiated citizenship is based on the absolutization of ‘the other’ as ‘the Other’, 
it will turn out to be more totalizing, hegemonizing, and marginalizing than its universal- 
istic predecessor. If, by contrast, differentiated citizenship is guided by the insight that 
difference must not be essentialized, it will have the potential of deconstructing, detotal- 
izing, and transcending the tacit essentialism of its universalistic predecessor. 
Second, there is a political problem. The extension of civil, political, and social citi- 
zenship to a potentially infinite number of different forms of citizenship leads to the 
relativistic impoverishment, rather than to the pluralistic enrichment, of contemporary 
accounts of ‘the political’. To differentiate citizenship in such a way that literally any 
kind of social group can claim to institutionalize their collective necessities would mean 
to convert citizenship into a mere identity game on a higher level. To be sure, what dis- 
tinguishes emancipatory from reactionary political projects is their capacity to prove that 
they have both a pluralistic commitment to difference and a universalistic commitment 
to equality. Yet, if this pluralistic commitment to difference is impregnated with the aim 
of turning every single individual or collective need into an issue of citizenship, then the 
emancipatory potentials of political pluralism are in danger of being undermined by the 
inflationary potentials of political relativism. 
  
 
 
Finally, there is a sociological problem. The practical viability of the theoretical 
discussions concerning the extension of citizenship is highly questionable. In social and 
political thought, the normative implications of the counterproductive gap between 
theory and practice are well known, even more so since the publication of Marx’s elev- 
enth thesis on Feuerbach.33 Amongst both sociologists and philosophers, there should be 
at least an implicit commitment to the critical study of social reality and to the pursuit of 
the question of how this reality can, or should, be changed. Merely theoretical debates on 
the institutionalization of social and cultural differences tend to produce rather sterile and 
somewhat detached accounts of the – in many ways unpredictable – complexities of 
human reality. One central empirical problem in modern society, however, is its inherent 
tendency towards generating processes of large-scale bureaucratization, whose socio- 
logical complexity tends to be underestimated by idealistic conceptions of differentiated 
citizenship. Most new social movements are reluctant to engage in the formulation of 
strategic programmes aimed at the institutionalization of political demands, precisely 
because they are deeply suspicious of being involved in processes of large-scale bureau- 
cratization. Nevertheless, if the institutionalization of differentiated citizenship leads to 
an over-bureaucratization of society, then both the practical viability and the normative 
validity of polycentrically anchored and pluralistically oriented forms of citizenship have 
to be called into question. 
In short, as long as the philosophical problem of essentialism, the political problem of 
relativism, and the sociological problem of idealism are not resolved, it may well remain 
necessary to identify and criticize the significant shortcomings of Marshall’s tripartite 
conception of citizenship, but it will also remain difficult to propose and implement a 
viable alternative. 
 
Conclusion 
The foregoing analysis has by no means sought to do justice to the entire complexity of 
the concept of citizenship. Rather, it has deliberately focused on some key dimensions 
which are essential to providing a theoretical framework for understanding the transfor- 
mation of citizenship in complex societies. The main insights gained from the previous 
study can be summarized as follows. 
(I) In order to understand why the concept of citizenship is enjoying a discursive 
revival, the recent debates on the nature and function of citizenship need to be put into 
historical context. As elucidated above, at least three historical tendencies have 
contributed to the thematic renaissance of the concept of citizenship: the consolida- 
tion of neoliberalism, the emergence of postcommunism, and the rise of multicultur- 
alism. Under the neoliberal model, citizenship has been transformed into a privatized 
affair of increasing commodification; in the postcommunist era, citizenship has been 
turned into a universalized affair of accelerated globalization; and, in the wake of 
multiculturalism, citizenship has been converted into a hybridized affair of cultural 
fragmentation. 
(II) Citizenship is neither a merely sociological nor a purely legal category; on the 
contrary, the socio-relational and politico-legal dimensions of citizenship are mutually 
inclusive and interdependent, rather than mutually exclusive and competing, facets of the 
  
 
 
 
modern world. A comprehensive theory of citizenship needs to account for the impor- 
tance of four key dimensions: the content, the type, the conditions, and the arrangements 
of citizenship. Such a four-dimensional analysis permits us to shed light on the norma- 
tivity of different contents of citizenship, the contentiousness of different types of citi- 
zenship, the malleability of the conditions of citizenship, and the legitimacy of the 
arrangements of citizenship. 
(III) Different sociological traditions emphasize different dimensions of citizenship. 
According to Marshall’s tripartite account, the historical development of modern citizen- 
ship is reflected in the gradual emergence of civil, political, and social rights. Civil citi- 
zenship, as a predominant paradigm of the eighteenth century, is aimed at conferring 
individuals with legal and judicial rights; political citizenship, as a predominant para- 
digm of the nineteenth century, is aimed at endowing individuals with participatory and 
electoral rights; and social citizenship, as a predominant paradigm of the twentieth cen- 
tury, is aimed at providing individuals with welfare rights. The historical significance of 
civil, political, and social rights manifests itself in the existence of three central institu- 
tions of modern society: the law courts, the parliament, and the welfare system. 
(IV) As argued above, Marshall’s theory of citizenship can be criticized on at least six 
grounds: 
 
(i) Contrary to an evolutionist view, the development of citizenship is not predeter- 
mined, linear, or necessarily progressive. 
(ii) Contrary to an idealistic view, the allocation of rights takes place mainly in 
moments of crisis in which the pursuit of integrationist strategies is imperative to 
securing the legitimacy of a given polity. 
(iii) Contrary to a formalistic view, citizenship is never totally completed but always 
potentially precluded. 
(iv) Contrary to an ethnocentric view, we need to account for the fact that different 
countries develop different – i.e. legally, politically, and socially specific – 
traditions of citizenship. 
(v) Contrary to a reformist view, although class struggle may have been ideologically 
domesticated, it has not been structurally eliminated by modern forms of citizen- 
ship. 
(vi) Contrary to a reductionist view, the democratic potentials inherent in civil society 
cannot be replaced by the steering capacity of modern étatisme, the normative 
challenges arising from the negotiation of identity and difference cannot be met 
by the all-embracing capacity of modern universalism, and the various contin- 
gencies emerging from the open-ended search for diversified forms of institu- 
tional recognition cannot be controlled by the assembling capacity of modern 
teleologism. 
 
(V) The comparative analysis of social movements and citizenship is useful in that it 
indicates that increasingly complex forms of large-scale social organization require 
increasingly complex forms of participation and representation. Abandoning a state-cen- 
tred view of citizenship is the first step towards confronting the normative challenges 
that arise from the possibility of cross-fertilizing the numerous political agendas produced 
  
 
 
by the simultaneous rivalry and complementarity of intersecting social struggles. In order 
to account for the multilayered complexity of coexisting social conflicts, we need to   put 
forward a bottom-up, rather than a top-down, approach to collective mobilization 
processes. 
There are substantial differences between early modern forms of political organization 
and late modern forms of social mobilization. Whereas the former are oriented towards 
the effective institutionalization of social struggles, the latter are aimed at the constant 
autonomization of social struggles. The former are primarily legal, political, and social; 
by contrast, the latter are primarily cultural. The former are embedded within the institu- 
tional structures of the state; the latter are located outside, and in fact seek to bypass, the 
institutional structures of the state. While the former are founded on systemic processes 
of indirect participation through representative forms of democracy, the latter are based 
on lifeworldly processes of direct participation through deliberative forms of democracy. 
To the extent that new social movements are made up of politically and discursively 
interconnected actors, purposive processes of collective mobilization are inconceivable 
without communicative processes of social coordination. What appears to manifest itself 
in the quest for individual and collective autonomy is a significant historical tendency: a 
paradigmatic shift from the ‘premodern’ preoccupation with the seizure of power and the 
‘modern’ concern with the participation in power towards the ‘late modern’ or ‘postmod- 
ern’ search for the autonomy from power. At the same time as ‘new’ social movements 
aim to overcome the étatisme of ‘old’ social movements, ‘new’ forms of citizenship seek 
to transcend the étatisme of ‘old’ forms of citizenship. 
(VI) While new social movements can be considered as collective actors capable of 
challenging the legitimacy of classical forms of citizenship, the politics of difference can 
be seen as a key ideological ingredient of contemporary normative agendas which prob- 
lematize the modern quest for universality by facing up to the challenges arising from 
increasing societal complexity. Nevertheless, as argued above, it is not citizenship in 
general but modern citizenship in particular which has come under attack. In essence, the 
politics of difference are aimed at pluralizing citizenship by recognizing that increasingly 
complex forms of society require ever more complex forms of citizenship. Thus, the rain- 
bow coalition of civil society ought to be translated into a rainbow agenda of citizenship. 
A significant strength of new forms of collective mobilization is their ability to convert 
the politics of difference into a constitutive component of the discursive landscapes of 
complex societies; a major weakness of classical forms of citizenship is their inability to 
confront and accept the normative challenges posed by the politics of difference in rela- 
tion to the emergence of societies of difference. 
The fundamental problem with the commitment to formal equality is that, in practice, 
it can lead to the production of substantial inequality. Ironically, then, the emancipatory 
commitment to equality can be perverted into a reactionary weapon of privileged groups 
capable of strengthening their position in society in the name of the ‘general will’. In 
reality, the pursuit of universal citizenship creates social processes of totalization, hege- 
monization, and marginalization. By conceiving of equality as sameness, undifferenti- 
ated forms of citizenship tend to homogenize the heterogeneous and therefore contribute 
to the disempowerment of social groups whose particularities and differences are – 
openly or tacitly – suppressed by the politics of the universal. 
  
 
 
 
An alternative conception of citizenship, expressed in the idea of a differentiated 
citizenship, must seek to overcome the disempowering implications of classical concep- 
tions of citizenship, articulated in the idea of a universal citizenship. Having said that, it 
is important to bear in mind that an emancipatory notion of a differentiated citizenship 
can only be regarded as philosophically defensible, politically useful, and sociologically 
feasible if it is able to transcend three potential pitfalls of identity politics: philosophical 
essentialism, political relativism, and sociological idealism. While it continues to be cru- 
cial to problematize and criticize both the theoretical and the empirical limitations of 
Marshall’s tripartite model of citizenship, it remains to be seen to what extent it is pos- 
sible to construct a viable alternative. 
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system’ (see Turner (1994 [1990]: 202). From a reformist perspective, then, welfare rights 
can be conceived of as a potential challenge to the legitimacy and functionality of capitalism; 
from a Marxist point of view, by contrast, welfare rights constitute an affirmative component 
of the absorbability and elasticity of capitalism. 
18. See, for example: Cohen and Arato (1992); Janoski (1998); Seligman (1995); Somers (2001). 
19. See, for example: Beck (1992); Beck et al. (1994); Giddens (1990). 
20. See, for example: Bauman and Tester (2007); Lash (1990); Smart (1990). 
21. See, for example: Bauman and Tester (2007); Beck (1992); Beck et al. (1994); Clark et al. (1993); 
Giddens (1990); Lash (1990); Serrano (1999); Smart (1990); Turner (1994a); von Beyme (1991). 
22.   Cf. Scott (1990: 16). Cf. also Taylor (1989: 20). 
23. See, for example: Cohen (1999); Cohen and Arato (1992); Janoski (1998); Seligman (1995); 
Somers (2001). It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyse the recent debates on the concept 
of civil society in the humanities and social sciences. For a useful introduction,     see Cohen 
(1998). According to Cohen, there are three approaches which are particularly important to 
the twentieth-century European debates on the concept of civil society. (i) The Gramscian 
approach stresses the ‘cultural and symbolic dimensions of civil society’ (1998: 6). Here, the 
reproduction of the existing social order is seen as result of the interplay between two 
dimensions: on the one hand, hegemony and consent through civil society, and, on the other 
hand, domination and coercion through the state. (ii) The Tourainean approach and the 
Meluccian approach seek to shed light on ‘the dynamic, creative and contestatory side of civil 
society’ (1998: 7). Here, civil society is conceived of as a dynamic, forward-looking, and 
innovative sphere of human emancipation. (iii) The Habermasian approach regards   ‘public 
  
 
 
 
opinion’ as ‘the normative core of the idea of civil society’ (1998: 8). Here, civil society is 
considered to be the normative basis of modern democracy. 
24. My translation; original text in Spanish: ‘un tercer sector, situado entre el Estado y el 
mercado’. 
25. My translation; original text in Spanish: ‘... la sociedad civil es un conjunto de movimientos 
sociales, asociaciones civiles, grupos informales e individuos influyentes en la opinión 
pública cuya acción mantiene y amplía los horizontes de la autonomía social.’ 
26. For a detailed analysis of this shift, see von Beyme (1991: 296–321). See also Susen (2008a: 
60–80; 2008b: 148–164). 
27. On the concept of empowerment, see, for example. Susen (2009a). 
28. On this point, cf. Turner (1994a: 155): ‘In sociological terms, there is no need to pose 
modernity and postmodernity as mutually exclusive developments.’ 
29.   Cf. Turner (1993: 15): 
In citizenship, it may be possible to reconcile the claims for pluralism, the need for solidarity 
and the contingent vagaries of historical change. If citizenship can develop in a context   with 
differences …, then citizenship need not assume a repressive character as a political 
instrument of the state. Thus, in a world which is increasingly more global, citizenship will 
have to develop to embrace both the globalization of social relations and the increasing social 
differentiation of social systems. The future of citizenship must therefore be extracted from 
its location in the nation-state. 
30. See also Janoski (1998: 25): ‘… while most theories of citizenship require the universality of 
rights and obligations, each universalistic right benefits certain groups more than others … .’ 
See also Isin and Wood (1999: 4): 
We approach the relationship between citizenship and identity from a perspective that sees 
modern citizenship … also as an articulating principle for the recognition of group rights. We 
conceive of citizenship … also as the practices through which individuals and groups 
formulate and claim new rights or struggle to expand or maintain existing rights …, we 
recognize the rise of new identities and claims for group rights as a challenge to the modern 
interpretation of universal citizenship, which is itself a form of group identity. 
Crouch et al. also refer to ‘issues of self-determination and group rights for minorities’(2001: 7). 
31. Or, alternatively, as the Zapatistas in Mexico put it: ‘¡Queremos un mundo en el que quepan 
muchos mundos!’ (cf. Holloway and Peláez, 1998). 
32. On this point, see Young (1990), esp. Ch. 4, section on ‘Postmodernist Critique of the Logic 
of Identity’ (98–99). Cf. Adorno (1973 [1966]: 146, 173, 216, and 279) and Susen (2009b: 
108–110). 
33. See Marx (2000/1977 [1845]: 173): ‘The Philosophers have only interpreted the world,       in 
various ways; the point is to change it.’ In this context, two observations are worth 
mentioning: (i) Engels replaced the comma after ‘interpretiert’ with a semicolon, and (ii) 
Engels added the word ‘aber’ (‘but’ or ‘however’) to Marx’s eleventh thesis on Feuerbach. 
Thus, Engels’s revised version reads as follows: ‘Die Philosophen haben die Welt nur 
verschieden interpretiert; es kommt aber darauf an, sie zu verändern’ (see Marx, 1971 [1845]: 
372). This formulation suggests not only that the relation between theory and practice is to be 
conceived of in terms of an opposition, but also that practice is more important than theory. 
Yet,  as Ernst Bloch pertinently remarks, what is essential to Marxian thought is the unity   of, 
rather than the opposition between, theory and practice. See Bloch (1971 [1968]: 93): ‘There 
is no opposition, and, indeed, in the original, the word “but” (“aber” – which here suggests 
amplification, not opposition) is lacking.’ For an excellent analysis of Marx’s Theses on 
Feuerbach, see Haug (1999). 
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